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NOTES
LAW-PRESUMPrIONS--ABROGATION OF TRIAL BY
JURY-COunty Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
CRIMINAL

I.

FACTS

On March 28, 1973, an automobile was stopped for speeding
on the New York State Thruway. The vehicle was occupied by
Melvin Lemmon, the driver, Jane Doe, a sixteen-year-old girl
seated beside him, and Samuel Allen and Raymond Hardrick, pas
sengers in the back seat. While the car was stopped, one of the of
ficers observed a gun protruding from Ms. Doe's handbag, which
was positioned on the floor of the car near the passenger side door.
Upon inspection, the handbag was found to contain two guns, a .45
automatic and a .38 revolver.1
The four occupants were tried and convicted of illegal posses
sion of the two handguns. 2 The convictions were upheld on appeal
by the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division3 and the New
York Court of Appeals. 4 The three male defendants filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York. The writ was granted and
upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir
cuit. 5 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 6
At issue in this case is the constitutionality of the presumption
contained in the statute under which the four were convicted, sec
tion 265.15(3) of the New York Penal Law. 7 This statute makes
1. County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 143 (1979).
2. They were acquitted of possession of a machine gun and a pound of heroin
found in the trunk of the car, presumably because none of them owned the car nor
had a key to the trunk. [d. at 144.
3. People v. Lemmon, 49 App. Div. 2d 639, 370 N.Y.S.2d 243 (1975).
4. People v. Lemmon, 40 N.Y.2d 505, 354 N.E.2d 836, 387 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1976).
5. Allen v. County Court, Ulster County, 568 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1977).
6. County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 439 U.S. 815 (1978).
7. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15(3) (McKinney 1967):
The presence in an automobile, other than a stolen one or a public omnibus,
of any firearm, defaced firearm, firearm silencer, bomb, bombshell, gravity
knife, switchblade knife, dagger, dirk, stiletto, billy, blackjack, metal knuc
kles, sandbag, sandclub or slingshot is presumptive evidence of its posses
67
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presence in an automobile found to contain an illegal weapon pre
sumptive evidence of possession by all occupants of the automo
bile. As interpreted by the New York Court of Appeals, the pre
sumption created by the statute is permissive. 8 Under this
interpretation, the jury is allowed, but not required, to find the
presumed fact of possession from proof of the basic facts of pres
ence of the guns and persons. 9 The importance of the presumption
is that this possibility of possession by all of the car's occupants is
commanded to the jury's attention via the judge's instructions. At
trial, the prosecution relied upon the presumption to prove its
case. 10 In their application for habeas corpus, the defendants con
tended that the presumption constituted a denial of due process
because of its failure to conform to the standards previously
adopted by the United States Supreme Court.ll

II.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Functions of Presumptions

Presumptions developed from the common-law practice of
judges' commenting on and interpreting the evidence while in
structing the jury.12 As similar factual situations presented them
sion by all persons occupying such automobile at the time such weapon, in
strument or appliance is found, except under the following circumstances:
(a) if such weapon, instrument or appliance is found upon the person of
one of the occupants therein;
(b) if such weapon, instrument or appliance is found in an automobile
which is being operated for hire by a duly licensed driver in the due, lawful
and proper pursuit of his trade, then such presumption shall not apply to the
driver; or
(c) if the weapon so found is a pistol or revolver and one of the occu
pants, not present under duress, has in his possession a valid license to have
and carry concealed the same.
8. People v. Lemmon, 40 N.Y.2d 505, 510, 354 N.E.2d 836, 840, 387 N.Y.S.2d
97, 100 (1976).
9. The judge's instruction to the jury reflected this interpretation: "Our Penal
Law also provides that the presence in an automobile ... of any handgun ... is pre
sumptive evidence of their unlawful possession.
In other words ... you may infer and draw the conclusion that such prohibitive
weapon was possessed by each of the defendants who occupied the automobile
. . . ." 442 U.S. at 161 (quoting trial transcript at 743) (emphasis added). Were the
presumption mandatory, the jurors would have been told that they must draw the
conclusion unless it was rebutted by evidence to the contrary.
10. Allen v. County Court, Ulster County, 568 F.2d 998, 1000 (2d Cir. 1977).
11. County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 146 (1979). For a
discussion of the standards, see text accompanying notes 30-45 infra.
12. McCormick, What Shall the Trial Judge Tell the Jury About Presumptions?,
13 WASH. L. REV. 185, 186 (1938).
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selves and the instructions were repeated, these judicial sentiments
were hardened into rules of law. Presumptions were eventually
created by statute as well. 13 Although originally developed to ac
cord with likelihood and probability, presumptions came to be
used for other purposes. Presumptions have been invoked to serve
six major functions. 14
First, they may exclude issues which might not be litigated. A
presumption of this nature merely affects the burden to plead an
issue. An example would be what is often called the "presumption
of sanity." All this may mean is that if a defendant intends to make
insanity an issue in the case, he must raise it. The burden of proof
remains on the prosecution. There is no effect on the jury's delib
erations. Indeed, the jury is not even instructed as to the existence
of any presumption. The entire effect is procedural. This type of
presumption raises none of the difficulties to be discussed in this
note.
Second, a presumption may avoid a procedural impasse where
evidence as to the presumed fact is lacking. For example, in a few
jurisdictions, when a person has been unexplainedly absent for
seven years, death is presumed to take place at the first instant of
the eighth year of absence. 15
Third, a presumption may avoid an impasse due to the impos
sibility of securing competent evidence. Illustrative are statutes fix
ing the order of death in common disasters for the purpose of
determining rights to inheritance and to insurance benefits. IS
Fourth, a presumption may serve to produce a result in accord
with the preponderance of probability. This is the original function
of presumptions, dating back to judges' commenting on the evi
dence while instructing the jury.
Fifth, one may place the burden of producing evidence upon
the party with the greater access to it. This is one reason for the
tort doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. A defendant is presumptively
negligent when the instrumentality of the injury was in his exclu
sive control. 17
13. An early presumption of theft from possession of stolen property is found in
the laws of Ine, the King of Wessex, (688-725 A.D.). J. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREA
TISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE AT COMMON LAW 327 (1898).
14. Morgan, How to Approach Burden of Proof and Presumptions, 25 ROCKY
MTN. L. REV. 34 (1953).
15. Montgomery v. Bevans, 17 F. Cas. 628 (C.C.D. Cal. 1871) (No. 9,735). See
Annot., 75 A.L.R. 630 (1931).
16. Morgan, supra note 14, at 44 (citing Uniform Simultaneous Death Act).
17. See Hake v. George Wiedemann Brewing Co., 23 Ohio St. 2d 65, 262
N.E.2d 703 (1970); Byrne v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863).
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Sixth, a presumption may be used to achieve a socially desir
able result. A child born to a married woman is presumed to be the
child of her husband. This presumption serves the societal goal of
encouraging parents to support their children.
Some of these functions, while justifiable in a civil context, are
inconsistent with the basic purposes of the criminal law. Presump
tions creating a substitute for evidence where evidence is un
attainable or nonexistent are justifiable in civil cases. The purpose
of civil law is to settle controversies between private parties. The
value of presumptions is in providing an end to the controversy in
a consistent and predictable fashion. The harm of an incorrect re
sult is outweighed by the social good achieved by ending the
dispute.
In criminal law, however, such an artificial substitute for evi
dence would increase the possibility of mistakenly convicting an in
nocent person while it would lessen the possibility of acquitting the
guilty because guilt would be found without evidence. On the con
trary, our society has long felt it a greater evil to find guilty and to
punish an innocent person than to allow a guilty person to es
cape. 1S The principle which is the very essence of criminal law
is that evidence must be presented to prove the guilt of the ac
cused. Therefore, most criminal law presumptions dealt with by
the United States Supreme Court have sought justification because
they served functions of rationality or convenience. 19

B.

Historical Use of Presumptions in Criminal Cases
Prior to 1911, the United States Supreme Court had not con
sidered the problems of presumptions in any depth. When the mat
ter was raised in a few state criminal cases, the Court dispensed
with it quickly, holding that a state legislature had the right to de
termine what evidence would be accepted in its courts. 20
In 1911, in the case of Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Rail
road v. Turnipseed,21 a civil action for wrongful death, the Court
first expressed the "rational relation" test. A Mississippi statute
created a presumption of negligence on the part of a railroad when
18. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
19. For an explanation of convenience and rationality, see text accompanying
notes 16-17 supra.
20. Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 599 (1904); Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 729 (1893).
21. 219 U.S. 35 (1910).
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an injury was inflicted due to the railroad's operation. 22 The rail
road company contended that this statute violated the due process
and the equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The
Court held that in order for a presumption to be constitutional
there must be a "rational connection between the fact proved and
the ultimate fact presumed. . . . "23
Applying this standard, the Court upheld the presumption,
stating that "It is not an unreasonable inference that a derailment
of railway cars is due to some negligence, either in construction or
maintenance of the track or trains, or some carelessness in opera
tion. "24 Thus, rationality was established as a test for the validity of
presumptions. Although Turnipseed was a civil case, the rational
relation test would become important in analyzing the validity of
presumptions in criminal cases.
The Court, in other cases, developed two other tests, the
"comparative convenience" test25 and the "greater-includes-the
lesser" test. 26 The comparative convenience test required a pre
sumption to be upheld if its function was to shift the burden of
producing evidence to the defendant if he had more convenient ac
cess to it. The greater-includes-the-Iesser test provided that the
presumption must be constitutional if the statute establishing the
crime was still constitutional when the element of the crime
proved by the presumption was deleted from the definition of the
statute. For example, in Ferry v. Ramsay,27 a Kansas statute made
it unlawful for any bank director to assent to the receipt of deposits
when he had knowledge that the bank was insolvent. The law fur
ther provided that the fact of insolvency invoked a presumption of
knowledge on the part of the director.28 Justice Holmes held that
since it would have been within the legislature's power to impose

22. In all actions against railroad companies for damages done to persons
or property, proof of injury inflicted by the running of the locomotives or
cars of such company shall be prima Jacie evidence of the want of reasona
ble skill and care on the part of the servants of the company in reference to
such injury.
ld. at 41.
23. ld. at 45. Although Turnipseed was a civil case, it continues to be cited as
authority for the rational relation test in criminal cases.
24. ld. at 44.
25. Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934).
26. Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U.S. 88 (1928).
27. ld.
28. ld. at 93.
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liability without knowledge, it was likewise permissible to take the
lesser step of presuming knowledge. 29
The rational relation test prevailed. In the case of Tot v.
United States, 30 a criminal case, the Supreme Court expressly re
jected the greater-includes-the-Iesser test. The Court was con
cerned only with the constitutionality of the statute as written, not
with hypothetical statutes which Congress for whatever reason had
chosen not to enact. 31 The comparative convenience test was dis
missed as a mere "corollary. "32 By "corollary" the Court apparently
meant that, though convenience may be a goal served by a pre
sumption, it alone cannot render a presumption constitutional. Tot
established the Turnipseed rationality test3 3 as the controlling fac
tor34 in determining the constitutionality of presumptions.
Although the Court had recognized the significance of pre
sumptions and appeared to have developed a specific test to deter
mine their constitutionality, significant problems remained. One of
these problems was the difficulty and arbitrariness involved in ap
plying the rationality standard, as illustrated by the Court's hold
ings in two 1965 cases, United States v. Gainey 35 and United States
v. Romano. 36 In these cases, the Court was faced with presump
tions created by separate subsections of 26 U.S.C. § 5601. 37 Sub
section b(2), at issue in Gainey, created a presumption that persons
present at the site of an illegal still were guilty of carrying on an il
legal distilling operation. The Court found this presumption to be
rational and, therefore, constitutionally valid. 38 In Romano, subsec
tion b(l) was at issue. This subsection created a presumption of il
legal possession of a still from proof of the defendant's presence at
the site. This presumption was found to be irrational and un
constitutional. 39 In reaching contrary results in these two almost
identical cases, the Court demonstrated that it was engaging in a
kind of legal hairsplitting which could result only in confusion.
Further complications developed with the Court's holding in
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

[d. at 94-95.
319 U.S. 463 (1943).
[d. at 472.
[d. at 467.
See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
319 U.S. at 467-68.
380 U.S. 63 (1965).
382 U.S. 136 (1965).
26 U.S.C. § 5601 h(I), (2) (1976).
380 U.S. at 68-71.
382 U.S. at 141.
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In re Winship.4o This decision was not concerned with presump
tions. It dealt with a New York statute which required proof by a
preponderance of the evidence in a juvenile proceeding to estab
lish delinquency. The New York Family Court Act41 defined a ju
venile delinquent as a person between seven and sixteen years of
age who does any act which, if done by an adult, would constitute
a crime. Thus, in practical effect, the juvenile proceeding was a
criminal trial. The Court unequivocally held that the Constitution
requires a "beyond reasonable doubt" standard of proof as to every
element of a crime. 42
The holding of Winship may have impact on the law of pre
sumptions. If a state is prohibited from a general lowering of the
standard of proof in criminal cases, it should likewise be prohibited
from lowering that standard as to a specific element of the crime
charged. Commentators have theorized that if a criminal law pre
sumption is to be constitutionally valid, the fact presumed must
follow, beyond a reasonable doubt, from the fact proven. 43 In
County Court of Ulster County v. Allen,44 the Court confronted
this issue for the first time. 45
III.

COUNTY COURT OF ULSTER COUNTY
V. ALLEN-THE OPINION

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to con
sider the questions of whether it was proper for th~ United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to examine the facial con
stitutionality of the statute, and whether the application of the pre
sumption in this case was constitutional. 46
The Court47 held that the Second Circuit had erred by consid
40. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
41. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 712 (McKinney 1975).
42. "Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the
resonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of ev
ery fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." 397 U.S. at 364.
43. Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions and Burden of Proof in Crimi
nal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1336 (1979).
44. 442 U.S. 140 (1979). See text accompanying notes 1-11 supra.
45. The Court alluded to this issue but declined to decide it in Barnes v.
United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973); Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970); and
Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
46. 442 U.S. at 147. For a procedural history, see text accompanying notes 3-6
supra.
47. Justice Stevens wrote the Court's opinion. Justice Powell, joined by Jus
tices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall, dissented.
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ering the statute on its' face. 48 Facial attacks consider all possible
applications of the statute including hypothetical situations. The
Second Circuit had interpreted the rational relation test to mean
that the presumed fact must flow more likely than not from the
proven fact in common experience, without regard to any particu
lars of the instant case. The Second Circuit had considered several
hypothetical situations and concluded that it could not be said that
presence in an automobile containing an illegal weapon meant, in
more cases than not, that each person present had possession of
the weapon. 49
The Supreme Court explained that the federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction and, therefore, have a duty to avoid
deciding unnecessary questions. 50 Hence, with the limited excep
tion for statutes broadly prohibiting speech protected by the first
amendment, a party may not assert that a statute would be in vio
lation of the rights of others in hypothetical situations. 51 The Court
held that the Second Circuit's application of the more likely than
not test was wrong and that the proper analysis should be whether,
in light of all the circumstances of the case, it was rational for the
jury to make the inference suggested by the statute. 52
The Court then analyzed the facts in their entirety and found
that since the two handguns were too large to fit completely into
Ms. Doe's handbag, they may have been thrust there at the last
minute, that such heavy weapons are unlikely to be possessed by a
sixteen-year-old girl, and that it was more likely that she relied for
protection on the knife found on her person. If, as was reasonable,
the jury rejected the notion that the guns were in Ms. Doe's sole
possession, then the Court said the case was tantamount to one
where the guns were lying unconcealed in plain view of all the oc
cupants. In such a case a jury would be rational in inferring posses
sion of the guns by all occupants of the car. 53
The Court rejected the argument that the standard for
determining the constitutional validity of a presumption should be
beyond a reasonable doubt. 54 Since this was a permissive presump
tion, the jury was free to reject it if, on the basis of all the evi
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

442 U.S. at 163.
568 F.2d at 1006-07.
442 U.S. at 154-55.
Jd.
Jd. at 161-62.
Id. at 164-65.
Jd. at 166-67.
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dence, it was not satisfied that guilt had been proven beyond a rea
sonable doubt. The Court likened the presumption to a piece of
relevant evidence which need not independently prove the case. 55
It was crucial to the Court's determination of both the facial
validity issue and the reasonable doubt issue that the presumption
was permissive. Had the presumption been mandatory, the facial
attack would have been permitted and the reasonable doubt
standard required. 56
The dissenting opinion disapproved of the different standards
prescribed by the majority for facial attacks on permissive, as op
posed to mandatory, presumptions. 57 The dissent observed that the
jury instruction in this case authorized the jury to find possession
on the basis of the presumption alone even if it rejected all other
evidence bearing on the issue. 58 The jury may not have found it
unlikely that the guns were in Ms. Doe's sole possession. Contrary
to whether the majority believed it reasonable, the jury may not
have found that the case was "tantamount to one in which the guns
were lying on the floor or seat of the car in plain view of the three
other occupants of the automobile. "59 In short, had the presump
tion not been given, the jury may not have returned guilty ver
dicts. For this reason, the dissent agrees with the Second Circuit
that the presumption's rationality must be examined apart from any
other factors in the case.
Examining the presumption in this way, the dissent found that
it is not "more likely than not" that an occupant of a car is in pos
session of any illegal weapon found in that car. 60 The inference
without more is plainly irrational. 61 Because the dissent arrived at
this conclusion, it was unnecessary to consider the reasonable doubt
standard. 62

55. "There is no more reason to require a permissive statutory presumption to
meet a reasonable doubt standard before it may be permitted to play any part in a
trial than there is to require that degree of probative force for other relevant evi
dence before it may be admitted." Id.
56. [d. at 159-60, 167. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
57. 442 U.S. at 176-77 (Powell, J., dissenting). Because the dissenters would
have reversed based on a more likely than not standard, they found it unnecessary to
consider the reasonable doubt issue.
58. [d. at 175-76 (Powell, J., dissenting).
59. [d. at 175 n.7 (quoting majority at 164). See text accompanying note 53 su
pra.
60. 442 U.S. at 174.
61. [d. at 176.
62. [d. at 169 n.2.
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CRITICISM

After Winship 63 established that the prosecution had the bur
den of proving every element of a crime beyond a reasonable
doubt, the appropriate standard for determining the constitutional
validity of a presumption was called into question.' The crucial is
sue is whether a presumption must be true beyond a reasonable
doubt if an element of the crime is to be proven hy use of the pre
sumption. To resolve this question, the Court established a distinc
tion between mandatory and permissive presumptions. Henceforth,
a mandatory presumption must meet the beyond reasonable doubt
test. 64 A permissive presumption need only be true more likely
than not. 65
This distinction between permissive and mandatory presump
tions is ill-founded. Although the dissent did not reach this issue,
the conclusion that the more likely than not standard is insufficient
flows logically from its analysis of the facial question. The dissent
observed that the jury may have found possession based on no evi
dence other than the presumption. If this were the case, the
standard of proof required by Winship has not been met unless the
presumption is true beyond a reasonable doubt. Contrary to the
majority's characterization, a presumption is not just one more
piece of evidence "on which the prosecution is entitled to rely as
one not-necessarily-sufficient part of its proof. . . . "66 The jury is
instructed that the presumption is sufficient to establish unlawful
possession. 67 At a minimum, therefore, the Court should establish
the beyond a reasonable doubt test as the standard for determining
the constitutional validity of all criminal presumptions.
V.

PROPOSAL-ELIMINATE CRIMINAL

LAw PRESUMPTIONS

Even if the Court were to go so far as to say that all presump
tions must meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, impor
tant problems would remain. Central to our system of justice, and
guaranteed by the Constitution, is the right to trial by jury.68 This
guarantee must mean more than having a small group of people go
through the formality of listening to a presentation before pronounc
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
391 U.S.

397 U.S. at 358.
442 U.S. at 166-67.
Id.
Id. at 166.
See note 9 supra.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 and amends. VI & XIV. See Duncan v. Louisiana,
145 (1968).
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ing the accused guilty. In particular, it must mean that the jury
should be left to wrestle with the diffiGult concepts involved in the
words "beyond a reasonable doubt" before reaching a conclusion .. A
judge could not instruct a jury "you may find the accused guilty,
and we will let the appellate court decide whether there is proof
beyond a reasonable doubt." The effect of a presumption may be to
do exactly that as to a given element of the crime. Jury instructions
are often long and complex. 69 Adrift in a sea of vague concepts
In Alien, the instructions to the jury included the following:
[Y]ou are the exclusive judge of all the questions of fact in this case.
That means that you are the sole judges as to the weight to be given to the
evidence and to the weight and probative value to be given to the testimony
of each particular witness and to the credibility of any witness.

69.

Under our law, every defendant in a criminal trial starts the trial with
the presumption in his favor that he is innocent, and this presumption fol
lows him throughout the entire trial and remains with him until such time as
you, by your verdict find him or her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt or in
nocent of the charge. If you find him or her not guilty, then, of course, this
presumption ripens into an established fact. On the other hand, if you find
him or her guilty then this presumption has been overcome and is de
stroyed.
It is your duty to consider all the testimony in this case, to weigh it
carefully and assess the credit to be given to a witness by his apparent in
tention to speak the truth and by the accuracy of his memory to reconcile, if
possible, conflicting statements as to material facts and in such ways to try
and get at the truth and to reach a verdict upon the evidence.
As so defined, possession means actual physical possession, just as hav
ing the drugs or weapons in one's hand, in one's home or other place under
one's exclusive control, or constructive possession which may exist without
personal dominion over the drugs or weapons but with the intent and ability
to retain such control or dominion.
Our Penal Law also provides that the presence in an automobile of any
machine gun or of any handgun or firearm which is loaded is presumptive
evidence of their unlawful possession.
In other words, these presumptions or this latter presumption upon
proof of the presence of the machine gun and the hand weapons, you may
infer and draw conclusions that such prohibitive weapon was possessed by
each of the defendants who occupied the automobile at the time when such
instruments were found. The presumption or presumptions is effective only
so long as there is no substantial evidence contradicting the conclusion flow
ing from the presumption, and the presumption is said to disappear when
such contradictory evidence is adduced.
To establish the unlawful possession of the weapons, again the People
relied upon the presumption and, in addition thereto, the testimony of
Anderson and Lemmons who testified in their case in chief.
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such as possession and reasonable doubt, the New York statute
gives the jury one compass upon which it may rely. It is told that
the law equates presence with possession. It is far too likely that
the jury will quickly grasp the presumption and, by clinging to it,
avoid the task of grappling with the complexities of possession and
reasonable doubt. Even if the presumption is then found by an ap
pellate court to meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, the
accused's right to a jury determination has been abridged.
After the Court's opinion in Tot 70 the only valid functions
which a presumption constitutionally may serve are those of estab
lishing a rational relation between basic and presumed facts, espe
cially when the burden can be put on the party with more conven
ient access. Although convenience by itself is not enough to justify
a presumption, convenience may be asserted as one goal achieved
by otherwise valid presumptions. 71 The argument for convenience
is that if the defendant can more easily prove that the inference
recommended by the presumption does not apply to him, the bur
den should be upon him to do so. According to the convenience
theory, then, if Hardrick, one of the Allen defendants who was in
the back seat, did not have any dominion or control over the guns,
at least he knew who did. He was in a better position than the
Now, in order to find any of the defendants guilty of the unlawful pos
session of the weapons, the machine gun, the .45 and the .38, you must be
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants possessed the ma
chine gun and the .45 and the .38, possessed it as I defined it to you before.
Accordingly, you would be warranted in returning a verdict of guilt
against the defendants or defendant if you find the defendants or defendant
was in possession of a machine gun and the other weapons and that the fact
of possession was proven to you by the People beyond a reasonable doubt,
and an element of such proof is the reasonable presumption of illegal pos
session of a machine gun or the presumption of illegal possession of fire
arms, as I have just before explained to you.
The presumption or presumptions which I discussed with the jury rela
tive to the drugs or weapons in this case need not be rebutted by affirmative
proof or affirmative evidence but may be rebutted by an evidence or lack of
evidence in the case.
442 U.S. at 160-62.
70. 319 U.S. 463 (1943). See text accompanying notes 30-34 supra.
71. Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions and Due Process in Crimi
nal Cases: A Theoretical Overoiew, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 180 (1969). See text accompa
nying notes 15-19 supra.
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prosecution to explain what the relationships of all the occupants
were to the guns.
The convenience theory, however, is in conflict not only with
the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination but also with
the common-law tradition establishing our system of justice as ac
cusatory, not inquisitory.72 The prosecution must first prove guilt
before the defendant can be asked to prove anything. Only when
guilt has been proven under the statute should the burden fall
upon the defendant to rebut the evidence. In analyzing the consti
tutional posture of a criminal presumption, therefore, convenience
is not an appropriate consideration.
Even if the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is applied,
this should not render a presumption valid. If the presumption is
true beyond a reasonable doubt, it adds nothing to the trial by its
inclusion. Without the presumption, the basic facts may be estab
lished since the evidentiary test for relevancy is even less than
more likely than not. For example, the federal rule merely re
quires that the evidence have "any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable . . . ."73 If the basic facts then give
rise to a logical inference, the prosecutor remains free to point that
out to the jury. If the inference advocated by the prosecutor is it
self proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury will recognize that
and will find the fact true beyond a reasonable doubt. If the infer
ence is not so strong, but has some merit, the jury will attach to it
the weight it deserves and will come to the proper conclusion.
That is what a jury is for.
The only factor added by a presumption is the jury instruc
tion. The effect of a jury instruction may be to cloak with judicial
respectability an inference which the jury may not have reached on
its own. Even the Court in Allen recognized that a presumption
must not undermine the fact finder's responsibility at trial to find
the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of evi
dence adduced by the state. 74 Since a presumption cannot enhance

72. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964);
United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460, 471 (1827).
73. FED. R. EVID. 401.
74. 442 U.S. at 156.
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a jury's ability to perform its responsibility, it can only be constitu
tional if it has no effect at alPs
In Allen, if the instruction on the presumption had not been
given, the jury would have been able to consider such factors as
the ages of the car's occupants, their positions in the car, and the
size and location of the guns. The jury mayor may not have con
cluded, based upon all these factors, that the defendants were
guilty of unlawful possession beyond a reasonable doubt. The Su
preme Court concluded that the presumption did not interfere
with the jury's ability to make a proper analysis. Had the presump
tion not been given, however, it could not have interfered with the
jury's analysis.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court, in County Court of Ulster
County v. Allen,76 upheld the convictions of three men for illegal
possession of handguns. The men and a sixteen-year-old girl were
occupants of a car which police stopped on the New York State
Thruway. Two guns were found in the girl's pocketbook. A statu
tory presumption of possession from proof of presence in the auto
mobile was used to convict the three men. The constitutionality of
the presumption was the issue presented to the Court.
In upholding this presumption, the Supreme Court adopted
two standards to analyze the constitutional validity of criminal pre
sumptions. A mandatory presumption must be true beyond a rea
sonable doubt. A permissive presumption need only be true more
likely than not. Such a distinction is unjustified since even a per
missive presumption may be relied on by the jury to establish
guilt.
Even the· beyond a reasonable doubt standard should not
render presumptions constitutional in criminal cases. Presumptions
are an intrusion upon the jury's responsibility to determine guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Allowing an appellate court to test
whether a presumption is true beyond a reasonable doubt should
not be a constitutionally permissible substitute for a trial by jury.
Steven A. Bolton
75. For an attempt to quantify the magnitude of the possible harmful effects of
presumptions, see Ashford & Risinger, supra note 71.
76. 442 U.S. at 140.

